Metadata¶
Data around the exchange: accounts, IP, timing, volume, devices or groups.
Metadata
Data around the exchange: accounts, IP, timing, volume, devices or groups. Learn more
End-to-end encryption — E2EE
Participants’ devices control content keys. The transport server should not read ordinary messages. Learn more
Pseudonymity
Use an identity different from your civil identity. It can still be linked to you. Learn more
Network anonymity
Reduce the ability to link traffic to your network address or its destination. Learn more
| Messenger | What the provider learns | What the contact learns | What the network / ISP learns | Apple / Google exposure | Public law-enforcement evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Signal | What the provider learnsRegistration number and limited account data; not normal E2EE content by design. [1] [2] | What the contact learnsThe contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] | What the network / ISP learnsThe network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] | Apple / Google exposureStore, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] | Public law-enforcement evidencePublished 2026 provider response: creation and last-connection dates for six accounts; not messages. [1] [2] [3] |
| SimpleX | What the provider learnsRelays see their transport data; message bodies are E2EE. Declared non-logging was not measured here. [1] [2] | What the contact learnsThe contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] | What the network / ISP learnsThe network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] | Apple / Google exposureStore, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] | Public law-enforcement evidence2025 provider claim: 12 requests with no responsive information; no independent court dossiers. [1] [2] [3] |
| Olvid | What the provider learnsRouting and network information; actual production retention and access unknown. [1] [2] | What the contact learnsThe contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] | What the network / ISP learnsThe network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] | Apple / Google exposureStore, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] | Public law-enforcement evidenceNo individual disclosure case established here; this does not prove an absence of requests or data. [1] [2] |
| Session | What the provider learnsVisibility depends on the node; STUN/TURN receives beta-call IP addresses. [1] [2] | What the contact learnsThe contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] | What the network / ISP learnsThe network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] | Apple / Google exposureStore, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] | Public law-enforcement evidenceNo individual disclosure case established here; this does not prove an absence of requests or data. [1] [2] |
| Threema | What the provider learnsID and connection data; aggregate account-data disclosures are published. [1] [2] | What the contact learnsThe contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] | What the network / ISP learnsThe network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] | Apple / Google exposureStore, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] | Public law-enforcement evidence2025 and H1 2026 reports: aggregate account-data disclosures; not evidence of message-content disclosure. [1] [2] [3] |
| Cwtch | What the provider learnsNo single central provider; relays and peers have local visibility. [1] [2] | What the contact learnsThe contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] | What the network / ISP learnsThe network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] | Apple / Google exposureStore, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] | Public law-enforcement evidenceNo individual disclosure case established here; this does not prove an absence of requests or data. [1] [2] |
| Briar | What the provider learnsNo single central service; peers and transports remain in the model. [1] [2] | What the contact learnsThe contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] | What the network / ISP learnsThe network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] | Apple / Google exposureStore, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] | Public law-enforcement evidenceNo individual disclosure case established here; this does not prove an absence of requests or data. [1] [2] |
| Jami | What the provider learnsDHT, bootstrap, NAT and peers see their portion of the network. [1] [2] | What the contact learnsThe contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] | What the network / ISP learnsThe network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] | Apple / Google exposureStore, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] | Public law-enforcement evidenceNo individual disclosure case established here; this does not prove an absence of requests or data. [1] [2] |
| Tox / qTox | What the provider learnsDHT and peers; persistent ID linkable through reuse. [1] [2] | What the contact learnsThe contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] | What the network / ISP learnsThe network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] | Apple / Google exposureStore, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] | Public law-enforcement evidenceNo individual disclosure case established here; this does not prove an absence of requests or data. [1] [2] |
| Matrix / Element | What the provider learnsHomeserver sees account, devices, membership, events and IP. [1] [2] | What the contact learnsThe contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] | What the network / ISP learnsThe network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] | Apple / Google exposureStore, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] | Public law-enforcement evidencematrix.org guide available; no concrete production established here; other homeservers are separate. [1] |
| XMPP / OMEMO | What the provider learnsServer sees JID, presence, connections and roster depending on extensions. [1] [2] | What the contact learnsThe contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] | What the network / ISP learnsThe network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] | Apple / Google exposureStore, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] | Public law-enforcement evidenceNo individual disclosure case established here; this does not prove an absence of requests or data. [1] [2] |
| Telegram | What the provider learnsProvider can process cloud messages and metadata. [1] [2] | What the contact learnsThe contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] | What the network / ISP learnsThe network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] | Apple / Google exposureStore, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] | Public law-enforcement evidenceCivil production under seal in India; fields and scope partly contradictory. [1] |
| What the provider learnsNumber, usage graph, IP and service information remain exposure surfaces. [1] [2] | What the contact learnsThe contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] | What the network / ISP learnsThe network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] | Apple / Google exposureStore, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] | Public law-enforcement evidenceA 2025 DOJ complaint cites WhatsApp communication and group records; plaintext provenance and exact returned fields are not fully separated. [1] [2] | |
| Discord | What the provider learnsMessages, accounts, servers and membership visible to the platform. [1] [2] | What the contact learnsThe contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] | What the network / ISP learnsThe network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] | Apple / Google exposureStore, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] | Public law-enforcement evidenceU.S. v. Bryant: messages and account data actually produced under a warrant. [1] |
| Wire | What the provider learnsAccount, IP and service data remain. [1] [2] | What the contact learnsThe contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] | What the network / ISP learnsThe network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] | Apple / Google exposureStore, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] | Public law-enforcement evidenceRegistration email disclosed in the 2024 investigation; not evidence of message disclosure. [1] |
| Delta Chat | What the provider learnsEmail operator sees addresses, headers, timing and volumes. [1] [2] | What the contact learnsThe contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] | What the network / ISP learnsThe network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] | Apple / Google exposureStore, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] | Public law-enforcement evidenceNo individual disclosure case established here; this does not prove an absence of requests or data. [1] [2] |
| Ricochet Refresh | What the provider learnsNo single account provider; Tor and endpoints remain. [1] [2] | What the contact learnsThe contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] | What the network / ISP learnsThe network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] | Apple / Google exposureStore, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] | Public law-enforcement evidenceNo individual disclosure case established here; this does not prove an absence of requests or data. [1] [2] |
| Status / Waku | What the provider learnsManaged nodes can see IP, topics and activity. [1] [2] | What the contact learnsThe contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] | What the network / ISP learnsThe network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] | Apple / Google exposureStore, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] | Public law-enforcement evidenceNo individual disclosure case established here; this does not prove an absence of requests or data. [1] [2] |
The detailed evidence is maintained in the French Phase 2 register. The translation is a restatement, not new evidence.