Tox / qTox¶

Best suited for: Assessment of a specific client with P2P awareness. [1] [2]
Avoid if…: You assume uniform guarantees across mobile and desktop clients. [1]
Main strength: Key identity with no phone number imposed by the protocol. [1] [2]
Main weakness: Mobile clients, forks and maintenance are not interchangeable. [1] [2]
Account identifier: Public key / Tox ID; protocol and clients are distinct. [1] [2]
iOS: Depends on client and version; must be specified. [1] [2]
Android: Depends on client and version; must be specified. [1]
Windows: Depends on client and version; must be specified. [1] [2]
macOS: Depends on client and version; must be specified. [1] [2]
Linux: Depends on client and version; must be specified. [1] [2]
Confidence and scope: Scope-limited documentary evidence; production metadata and distributed binaries not experimentally verified. [1]

What your contact learns¶

What the contact learns: The contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2]

What the provider learns: DHT and peers; persistent ID linkable through reuse. [1] [2]

What the network / ISP learns: The network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2]
Apple / Google exposure: Store, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2]
Public law-enforcement evidence: No individual disclosure case established here; this does not prove an absence of requests or data. [1] [2]

E2EE: Tox E2EE; operational guarantees depend on each client. [1] [2]
Forward secrecy: Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Post-compromise security: Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Key verification: Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.

Metadata exposure: DHT and peers; persistent ID linkable through reuse. [1] [2]
Global user ID: Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Username / discovery: Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Push notifications: Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.

IP exposure to peer: P2P connections and calls can reveal IP. [1] [2]
Relay / TURN: Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Calls: Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Groups: Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.

Multi-device: Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Backups: Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.

Audits: Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Source code and binaries: Repositories and component-specific scopes recorded in Phase 2; no current binary rebuilt bit-for-bit here. [1] [2]
Main weakness: Mobile clients, forks and maintenance are not interchangeable. [1] [2]
Public law-enforcement evidence: No individual disclosure case established here; this does not prove an absence of requests or data. [1] [2]

Recommended configuration: Control devices, identities, notifications and files; verify client, version and calling path. [1] [2]
Remaining unknowns: Current network behaviour, distributed binaries and forensic evidence remain incomplete; check version, OS and configuration. [1] [2]

End-to-end encryption — E2EE

Participants’ devices control content keys. The transport server should not read ordinary messages. Learn more

Metadata

Data around the exchange: accounts, IP, timing, volume, devices or groups. Learn more

Pseudonymity

Use an identity different from your civil identity. It can still be linked to you. Learn more

Network anonymity

Reduce the ability to link traffic to your network address or its destination. Learn more

The detailed evidence is maintained in the French Phase 2 register. The translation is a restatement, not new evidence.