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Olvid vs Threema

Choose two to four messengers. Every property comes from the same traceable catalogue; unknowns remain explicit.

PropertyOlvidThreema
Account identifierCryptographic identity; no mandatory phone or email. [1] [2]Random Threema ID; optional phone and email. [1] [2]
Phone required by serviceNot required. [1] [2]Optional for discovery. [1] [2]
E2EEFormally studied protocol under limited assumptions; not an audit of the entire 2026 system. [1] [2]E2EE; properties depend on the client, particularly desktop beta. [1] [2]
Metadata exposureRouting keys, sizes and timing visible in the formal model. [1] [2]ID, connection data and optional identifiers; store purchase may link identities. [1] [2]
IP exposure to peerDocumented TURN-only calls: IP hidden from the peer, visible to the relay. [1] [2]Check calling mode and relay per client and configuration. [1] [2]
Multi-deviceLicensed multi-device; old history not automatically transferred. [1] [2]Desktop 2.0 beta: up to two computers, no PFS; older client depends on the phone. [1] [2]
Main strengthNo mandatory number; documented TURN-only calls. [1] [2]ID without mandatory phone or email; mobile maturity. [1] [2]
Main weaknessNo network anonymity; calls and multi-device require a licence. [1] [2]Desktop beta limits, account data and linkable purchases. [1] [2]
Best suited forAvoid sharing a number with the contact; verify cryptographic identity. [1] [2] [3] [4]Peer-facing pseudonymity without a mandatory number. [1] [2] [3] [4]
Confidence and scopeScope-limited documentary evidence; production metadata and distributed binaries not experimentally verified. [1]Client-specific properties; no PFS in Desktop 2.0 beta, retest status needs verification. [1] [2]
Technical details: identity, keys, push, devices, audits and evidence
PropertyOlvidThreema
Email requirementNot required. [1] [2]Optional for discovery. [1] [2]
Username / discoveryUnknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Number visible to contactNo mandatory number to share. [1] [2]Not needed when no number is linked / shared. [1] [2]
Global user IDCryptographic identity; server sees routing keys in the analysed model. [1] [2]Persistent random ID; optional linked identifiers add correlation. [1] [2]
Forward secrecyUnknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.Desktop 2.0 beta does not support PFS; do not generalise to other clients. [1] [2]
Post-compromise securityUnknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Key verificationVerify identity or fingerprint in person / through a separate channel. [1] [2]Verify identity / fingerprint through a separate channel. [1] [2]
Relay / TURNDocumented call candidates are TURN-only; no current packet capture performed. [1] [2]Call relay properties must be checked on the client being used. [1] [2]
What the provider learnsRouting and network information; actual production retention and access unknown. [1] [2]ID and connection data; aggregate account-data disclosures are published. [1] [2]
What the contact learnsThe contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2]The contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2]
What the network / ISP learnsThe network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2]The network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2]
Push notificationsUnknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Apple / Google exposureStore, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2]Store, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2]
GroupsUnknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
CallsCalls require a licence after the trial. [1] [2]Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
BackupsUnknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Source code and binariesRepositories and component-specific scopes recorded in Phase 2; no current binary rebuilt bit-for-bit here. [1] [2]Repositories and component-specific scopes recorded in Phase 2; no current binary rebuilt bit-for-bit here. [1] [2]
AuditsHistorical CSPN/Synacktiv work and 2026 formal analysis; distinct scopes and versions. [1] [2] [3]Cure53 and Ibex analyses: distinct scopes; desktop retest status needs verification. [1] [2] [3]
Public law-enforcement evidenceNo individual disclosure case established here; this does not prove an absence of requests or data. [1] [2]2025 and H1 2026 reports: aggregate account-data disclosures; not evidence of message-content disclosure. [1] [2] [3]
iOSYes, client listed in the study. [1] [2]Yes, client listed in the study. [1] [2]
AndroidYes, client listed in the study. [1]Yes, client listed in the study. [1]
WindowsYes, client listed in the study. [1] [2]Beta; desktop-specific limits. [1] [2]
macOSYes, client listed in the study. [1] [2]Beta; desktop-specific limits. [1] [2]
LinuxYes, client listed in the study. [1] [2]Beta; desktop-specific limits. [1] [2]
Avoid if…You require network anonymity or free multi-device after the trial. [1] [2] [3] [4]You require PFS on Desktop 2.0 beta or network anonymity. [1] [2] [3] [4]
Recommended configurationVerify identity / fingerprint out of band; assess licensing and history before adding a desktop. [1] [2] [3] [4]Do not link phone or email without need; verify fingerprints and each client’s limits. [1] [2] [3] [4]
Remaining unknownsCurrent network behaviour, distributed binaries and forensic evidence remain incomplete; check version, OS and configuration. [1] [2]Current network behaviour, distributed binaries and forensic evidence remain incomplete; check version, OS and configuration. [1] [2]
Ease of useCross-platform; licensing and old history are concrete constraints. [1] [2] [3] [4]Established mobile client; desktop experience remains beta and limited. [1] [2] [3] [4]
Network anonymityNo general resistance to a global passive observer is demonstrated. [1] [2]No general resistance to a global passive observer is demonstrated. [1] [2]

Customise this comparison

  • Compromised / unlocked device and spyware.
  • Copying, screenshots or disclosure by the contact.
  • Initial Discord traces, reused alias, avatar, voice or files.
  • Global correlation; relay, ISP, telecom, store and backup data depending on the path.