XMPP / OMEMO¶
- Best suited for
- Users able to configure and verify their stack. [1] [2]
- Main strength
- Federated stack with a choice of client and server. [1] [2]
- Main weakness
- No universal conclusion without specific client, version and server. [1] [2]
- Account identifier
- JID on a domain / server; selected clients. [1] [2]
- Android
- Depends on client and version; must be specified. [1]
- Confidence and scope
- Scope-limited documentary evidence; production metadata and distributed binaries not experimentally verified. [1]
What your contact learns¶
- What the contact learns
- The contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2]
What the provider learns¶
- What the provider learns
- Server sees JID, presence, connections and roster depending on extensions. [1] [2]
Other observers¶
- What the network / ISP learns
- The network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2]
- Apple / Google exposure
- Store, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2]
- Public law-enforcement evidence
- No individual disclosure case established here; this does not prove an absence of requests or data. [1] [2]
Encryption and keys¶
- Forward secrecy
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
- Post-compromise security
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
- Key verification
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Metadata and identity¶
- Metadata exposure
- Server sees JID, presence, connections and roster depending on extensions. [1] [2]
- Global user ID
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
- Username / discovery
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
- Push notifications
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Calls, IP and groups¶
- IP exposure to peer
- Jingle/ICE may be direct; TURN hides IP from the peer. [1] [2]
- Relay / TURN
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
- Calls
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
- Groups
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Devices and backups¶
- Multi-device
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
- Backups
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Audits, limitations and public cases¶
- Audits
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
- Source code and binaries
- Repositories and component-specific scopes recorded in Phase 2; no current binary rebuilt bit-for-bit here. [1] [2]
- Main weakness
- No universal conclusion without specific client, version and server. [1] [2]
- Public law-enforcement evidence
- No individual disclosure case established here; this does not prove an absence of requests or data. [1] [2]
Configuration and unknowns¶
- Recommended configuration
- Control devices, identities, notifications and files; verify client, version and calling path. [1] [2]
- Remaining unknowns
- Current network behaviour, distributed binaries and forensic evidence remain incomplete; check version, OS and configuration. [1] [2]
Understand the terms¶
End-to-end encryption — E2EE
Participants’ devices control content keys. The transport server should not read ordinary messages. Learn more
Metadata
Data around the exchange: accounts, IP, timing, volume, devices or groups. Learn more
Pseudonymity
Use an identity different from your civil identity. It can still be linked to you. Learn more
Network anonymity
Reduce the ability to link traffic to your network address or its destination. Learn more
The detailed evidence is maintained in the French Phase 2 register. The translation is a restatement, not new evidence.