Session¶

Best suited for: Candidate for reassessment after documented fixes and retesting; not a high-assurance starting point. [1] [2] [3] [4]
Avoid if…: Your scenario requires high assurance before findings are resolved. [1] [2] [3] [4]
Main strength: Phone-free identity and onion routing for messages. [1] [2]
Main weakness: Protocol V1 attacks and unknown fix / retest status; calls expose IP. [1] [2]
Account identifier: Random ID without a phone number; onion routing for messages. [1] [2]
iOS: Yes, client listed in the study. [1] [2]
Android: Yes, client listed in the study. [1]
Windows: Yes, client listed in the study. [1] [2]
macOS: Yes, client listed in the study. [1] [2]
Linux: Yes, client listed in the study. [1] [2]
Confidence and scope: High assurance not established: distributed fixes and post-WOOT 2026 retests remain unknown. [1] [2]

What your contact learns¶

What the contact learns: The contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2]

What the provider learns: Visibility depends on the node; STUN/TURN receives beta-call IP addresses. [1] [2]

What the network / ISP learns: The network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2]
Apple / Google exposure: Store, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2]
Public law-enforcement evidence: No individual disclosure case established here; this does not prove an absence of requests or data. [1] [2]

E2EE: Protocol V1: WOOT 2026 findings; current fixes and retests not established. [1] [2]
Forward secrecy: Protocol V1 lacks PFS according to the documentation recorded in Phase 2. [1] [2]
Post-compromise security: Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Key verification: Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.

Metadata exposure: Nodes and relays see their portion of traffic; calls expose IP. [1] [2]
Global user ID: Persistent Session ID, reusable and therefore linkable. [1] [2]
Username / discovery: Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Push notifications: Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.

IP exposure to peer: Beta P2P calls: IP exposed to peer and managed STUN/TURN. [1] [2]
Relay / TURN: Onion messages and P2P calls use different paths. [1] [2]
Calls: Beta, opt-in, P2P; not an anonymity guarantee. [1] [2]
Groups: Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.

Multi-device: Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Backups: Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.

Audits: Quarkslab 2021 and WOOT 2026 cover different scopes / versions. [1] [2] [3]
Source code and binaries: Repositories and component-specific scopes recorded in Phase 2; no current binary rebuilt bit-for-bit here. [1] [2]
Main weakness: Protocol V1 attacks and unknown fix / retest status; calls expose IP. [1] [2]
Public law-enforcement evidence: No individual disclosure case established here; this does not prove an absence of requests or data. [1] [2]

Recommended configuration: Check fixed version and retest; avoid P2P calls if the peer must not see your IP. [1] [2] [3] [4]
Remaining unknowns: Fixed versions, distribution on each platform and independent retests after WOOT 2026 are not established. [1]

End-to-end encryption — E2EE

Participants’ devices control content keys. The transport server should not read ordinary messages. Learn more

Metadata

Data around the exchange: accounts, IP, timing, volume, devices or groups. Learn more

Pseudonymity

Use an identity different from your civil identity. It can still be linked to you. Learn more

Network anonymity

Reduce the ability to link traffic to your network address or its destination. Learn more

The detailed evidence is maintained in the French Phase 2 register. The translation is a restatement, not new evidence.