Status / Waku¶
- Best suited for
- Assessment of a specific version and operator. [1] [2]
- Main strength
- Distributable architecture. [1] [2]
- Main weakness
- Persistent identity; actual operators, builds and clients need verification. [1] [2]
- Account identifier
- Wallet / key profile, depending on features. [1] [2]
- Android
- Depends on client and version; must be specified. [1]
- Confidence and scope
- Scope-limited documentary evidence; production metadata and distributed binaries not experimentally verified. [1]
What your contact learns¶
- What the contact learns
- The contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2]
What the provider learns¶
- What the provider learns
- Managed nodes can see IP, topics and activity. [1] [2]
Other observers¶
- What the network / ISP learns
- The network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2]
- Apple / Google exposure
- Store, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2]
- Public law-enforcement evidence
- No individual disclosure case established here; this does not prove an absence of requests or data. [1] [2]
Encryption and keys¶
- Forward secrecy
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
- Post-compromise security
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
- Key verification
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Metadata and identity¶
- Metadata exposure
- Managed nodes can see IP, topics and activity. [1] [2]
- Global user ID
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
- Username / discovery
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
- Push notifications
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Calls, IP and groups¶
- IP exposure to peer
- Current calls and network exposure not established as an advantage. [1] [2]
- Relay / TURN
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
- Calls
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
- Groups
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Devices and backups¶
- Multi-device
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
- Backups
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
Audits, limitations and public cases¶
- Audits
- Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question.
- Source code and binaries
- Repositories and component-specific scopes recorded in Phase 2; no current binary rebuilt bit-for-bit here. [1] [2]
- Main weakness
- Persistent identity; actual operators, builds and clients need verification. [1] [2]
- Public law-enforcement evidence
- No individual disclosure case established here; this does not prove an absence of requests or data. [1] [2]
Configuration and unknowns¶
- Recommended configuration
- Control devices, identities, notifications and files; verify client, version and calling path. [1] [2]
- Remaining unknowns
- Current network behaviour, distributed binaries and forensic evidence remain incomplete; check version, OS and configuration. [1] [2]
Understand the terms¶
End-to-end encryption — E2EE
Participants’ devices control content keys. The transport server should not read ordinary messages. Learn more
Metadata
Data around the exchange: accounts, IP, timing, volume, devices or groups. Learn more
Pseudonymity
Use an identity different from your civil identity. It can still be linked to you. Learn more
Network anonymity
Reduce the ability to link traffic to your network address or its destination. Learn more
The detailed evidence is maintained in the French Phase 2 register. The translation is a restatement, not new evidence.