Compare messengers¶
Choose two to four messengers. Every property comes from the same traceable catalogue; unknowns remain explicit.
| Property | Signal | SimpleX |
|---|---|---|
| Account identifier | Registration phone number; optional username. [1] [2] | Local profile; relationship-specific invitations. [1] [2] |
| Phone required by service | Yes, even when hidden from the contact. [1] [2] | Not required. [1] [2] |
| E2EE | Mature E2EE for messages and calls; endpoint security remains crucial. [1] [2] | Double Ratchet E2EE; message padding is declared. [1] [2] |
| Metadata exposure | Service knows the number; some account dates were publicly disclosed. [1] [2] | No global account; relays, queues, timing and iOS push remain exposure surfaces. [1] [2] |
| IP exposure to peer | Calls can be relayed; check the setting and actual network path. [1] [2] | Default TURN hides IP from the peer; P2P can reveal it. [1] [2] |
| Multi-device | Primary iPhone; official desktops linked through the phone. [1] [2] | Documented mobile–desktop pairing on the same local network; desktop beta. [1] [2] |
| Main strength | Mature content security, adoption and iPhone + PC usability. [1] [2] | Relationship separation without a mandatory global identifier. [1] [2] |
| Main weakness | Mandatory number known to the provider and telecom layer. [1] [2] | More multi-device friction; relays and notifications require care. [1] [2] |
| Best suited for | Everyday security; peer-facing pseudonymity with hardened settings. [1] [2] [3] [4] | Pseudonymous online contacts; minimising account identifiers. [1] [2] [3] [4] |
| Confidence and scope | Scope-limited documentary evidence; production metadata and distributed binaries not experimentally verified. [1] | Scope-limited documentary evidence; production metadata and distributed binaries not experimentally verified. [1] |
Technical details: identity, keys, push, devices, audits and evidence
| Property | Signal | SimpleX |
|---|---|---|
| Email requirement | Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question. | Not required. [1] [2] |
| Username / discovery | Optional; no public username directory. [1] [2] | No mandatory global username; optional public address should be avoided for compartmentalisation. [1] [2] |
| Number visible to contact | Can be hidden: number visibility AND discovery set to Nobody; a number already known to the contact is not forgotten. [1] [2] | No required number to disclose. [1] [2] |
| Global user ID | Service account remains linked to the phone number. [1] [2] | No global user ID required. [1] [2] |
| Forward secrecy | Documented protocol property; depends on clients and linked devices. [1] [2] | Documented Double Ratchet; versions and implementations still need verification. [1] [2] |
| Post-compromise security | Cryptographic recovery after temporary compromise; not while spyware remains in control. [1] [2] | Post-compromise recovery described by the protocol; requires an uncompromised endpoint. [1] [2] |
| Key verification | Out-of-band Safety Number; AKV does not certify identity and requires the other account’s number. [1] [2] | Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question. |
| Relay / TURN | Enable Always Relay Calls when peer IP exposure matters; the relay sees the IP. [1] [2] | Always use relay; TURN sees IP and duration. [1] [2] |
| What the provider learns | Registration number and limited account data; not normal E2EE content by design. [1] [2] | Relays see their transport data; message bodies are E2EE. Declared non-logging was not measured here. [1] [2] |
| What the contact learns | The contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] | The contact receives messages and the profile you share, and can keep a copy. [1] [2] |
| What the network / ISP learns | The network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] | The network sees destinations, timing and volume; Tor or a relay changes the observer. [1] [2] |
| Push notifications | Exact APNs payload not captured; manage local notification previews. [1] [2] | iOS push: queue and frequency data partly visible to the service; exact payload not captured. [1] [2] |
| Apple / Google exposure | Store, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] | Store, installation and push can create metadata; exact profile linkage depends on the OS and was not tested here. [1] [2] |
| Groups | Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question. | Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question. |
| Calls | Documented calls; their network path must be distinguished from messaging. [1] [2] | Documented calls; their network path must be distinguished from messaging. [1] [2] |
| Backups | Unknown: not established for the version and configuration in question. | Local profiles and history; complete version-specific backup guarantees not established here. [1] [2] |
| Source code and binaries | Repositories and component-specific scopes recorded in Phase 2; no current binary rebuilt bit-for-bit here. [1] [2] | Repositories and component-specific scopes recorded in Phase 2; no current binary rebuilt bit-for-bit here. [1] [2] |
| Audits | Protocols and AKV examined under distinct scopes; not the whole infrastructure or every binary. [1] [2] [3] | Trail of Bits 2022 and 2024 protocol review; announced 2026 review had no usable public report at the research cutoff. [1] [2] [3] |
| Public law-enforcement evidence | Published 2026 provider response: creation and last-connection dates for six accounts; not messages. [1] [2] [3] | 2025 provider claim: 12 requests with no responsive information; no independent court dossiers. [1] [2] [3] |
| iOS | Yes, client listed in the study. [1] [2] | Yes, client listed in the study. [1] [2] |
| Android | Yes, client listed in the study. [1] | Yes, client listed in the study. [1] |
| Windows | Yes, client listed in the study. [1] [2] | Beta; desktop-specific limits. [1] [2] |
| macOS | Yes, client listed in the study. [1] [2] | Beta; desktop-specific limits. [1] [2] |
| Linux | Yes, client listed in the study. [1] [2] | Beta; desktop-specific limits. [1] [2] |
| Avoid if… | You refuse to give a number to the service. [1] [2] [3] [4] | You cannot accommodate profile, relay and local-pairing constraints. [1] [2] [3] [4] |
| Recommended configuration | Visibility and discovery: Nobody; fresh username, neutral profile, verified Safety Number, relayed calls when needed. [1] [2] [3] [4] | Fresh profile, single-use invitation, no reused identity; TURN; deliberate iOS notification choice. [1] [2] [3] [4] |
| Remaining unknowns | Current network behaviour, distributed binaries and forensic evidence remain incomplete; check version, OS and configuration. [1] [2] | Current network behaviour, distributed binaries and forensic evidence remain incomplete; check version, OS and configuration. [1] [2] |
| Ease of use | Very practical for iPhone + PC; the primary phone remains necessary. [1] [2] [3] [4] | More setup and friction than Signal; local pairing. [1] [2] [3] [4] |
| Network anonymity | No general resistance to a global passive observer is demonstrated. [1] [2] | No general resistance to a global passive observer is demonstrated. [1] [2] |
Quick comparisons¶
- Signal vs SimpleX
- Signal vs Threema
- SimpleX vs Session
- Olvid vs Threema
- Cwtch vs Briar
- Signal vs WhatsApp
- Telegram vs Signal
End-to-end encryption — E2EE
Participants’ devices control content keys. The transport server should not read ordinary messages. Learn more
Pseudonymity
Use an identity different from your civil identity. It can still be linked to you. Learn more
Metadata
Data around the exchange: accounts, IP, timing, volume, devices or groups. Learn more
Network anonymity
Reduce the ability to link traffic to your network address or its destination. Learn more
Report 1.0 · 14 October 2026. No network lab, controlled forensic testing or bit-for-bit reproduction of binaries. Unknown remains Unknown.